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Boom in California Aerospace? 
The California aerospace-equipment manu-
facturing industry should benefit during the 
1982-87 period from a continuation of  the 
defense buildup launched by the Reagan 
Administration last year. Increased defense 
spending should translate into sales and 
employment growth in at least some sectors 
of this vast manufacturing complex, which 
includes not only aircraft and missiles but 
also electronic components (semiconductors 
and integrated circuitsL computers, and 
communication equipment. 
During the 1982-83 period, gains in defense-
related employment will be offset to some 
extent by weakness in commercial markets, 
especially for transport aircraft. But the situa-
tion should turn around by 1984. Atthattime, 
with the end of  the phase-out of  the Lockheed 
L  -1011 jet transport program, and with a pro-
jected upswing in business capital spending, 
the industry should experience coincident 
growth in both the military and commercial 
segments of  the market. 
Defense budget 
In fiscal 1982, total outlays by the Department 
of Defense (DOD) are rising nearly 8 percent 
in real (constant dollar) terms. Expenditures 
for military-hardware procurement and 
research-and-development -the  two budget 
components directly affecting defense con-
tractors' business-should rise even more in 
real terms, and thus should comprise 40 per-
cent of total outlays this fiscal year. 
The Defense proposal submitted to Congress 
last February reflects the Administration's 
intention to continue its effort to strengthen 
the U.S. conventional and strategic military 
forces (long-range nuclear weapons). In sup-
port of its proposals, the Administration cited 
the erosion of U.S. military forces and 
defense industrial base that has occurred over 
the past two decades, vis-a-vis the Soviet 
Union's rapid acceleration in defense spend-
ing and weapons production. 
The Administration thus proposed an 
increase in DOD total obligational authority 
from $214.2 billion in fiscal 1982 to $258 
billion in fiscal 1983 andto $400.8 billion by 
fiscal 1987. "Total obligational authority" 
means the authority granted to the Pentagon 
to commit funds for specified purposes. In 
real terms, these proposals represented an 
increase of about 13 percent in fiscal 1983 
and an average annual increase of nearly 
7 percent over the fiscal 1984-87 period. 
Throughout the five-year period, Pentagon 
outlays wou  Id rise more slowly than total 
authority, partly because of  the lag between 
authorization and spending, but also because 
of  the introduction of multi-year procure-
ment. (This system, unlike the annual Con-
gressional allotment of funds, requires larger 
authorizations at the start of a program, but 
then permits later cost-savings through 
advance purchases of long-lead-time mate-
rials.) Still, accO'rding to Administration 
estimates, actual defense outlays would rise 
at a hefty real rate of nearly 11  percent in 
fiscal 1983, on the heels of 1982's 8-percent 
increase (see chart). Over the fiscal 1984-87 
period, the proposals call for a 7Y2-percent 
annual rate of increase in real outlays, and an 
even faster gain in hardware procurement 
and research-and-development. 
The proposed $33-billion increase in outlays 
forfiscal 1983 called for several major new 
programs, including two nuclear aircraft 
carriers ($6.8 billionL 100 B-1 B bombers 
($4.1  billionL and development of an 
advanced-technology "Stealth" bomber. The 
Administration also asked for a $6.9-billion 
increase "to correct deficiencies" in strategic 
forces. This would include the cruise missile 
program, more Trident ballistic-missile sub-
marines, new ICBM and MX missiles, and a 
fleet of improved cargo aircraft. 
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Congress recently voted to cut on Iy about 
$5.4 billion (2.3 percent) from the Adminis-
tration's proposed 1983 defense outlays. 
After this cutback, the real increase will still 
amount to nearly 8 percent, and the slack 
probably will be picked up in later years. 
California employment 
To put this stimulus into perspective, it is 
necessary to review the past history of  Cali-
fornia's aerospace industry. The Vietnam 
buildup boosted employment to a peak of 
598,000 by 1968 (the data are annual aver-
ages.) Employment then trended downward 
to 440,000 in 1971, and recovered only 
modestly to 456,000 in 1977. But during the 
1977  -80 period, increased demand for com-
mercial products-especially sophisticated 
electronic equipment-caused employment 
to rise by 12  percent annually. 
In 1981, industry employment rose another 
2 percent, reaching 634,000, but almost 
entirely because of increased defense busi-
ness. Orders for commercial jet transports fell 
off sharply, especially after mid-year, reflect-
ing the impact of declining passenger traffic 
and rising fuel costs on the earnings of  the 
world's airlines. Civilian orders for electronic 
equipment also slowed as the national reces-
sion caused households and businesses to cut 
spending for such items as computers and 
communication equipment. Increased for-
eign competition added to the problems of 
California semiconductor firms, resulting in 
late-year plant shutdowns to work off excess 
inventory. 
Employment has slipped this year, with lay-
offs in commercial programs offsetting 
growth in defense-related payrolls. By May 
1982, employment was running 2 percent 
below the Ju Iy 1981  peak level. 
Defense impact 
By 1981, despite some inroads from competi-
tors elsewhere, California aerospace equip- . 
ment firms managed to capture 23 percent of 
DOD prime contract awards. Moreover, the 
California industry, the national leader, could 
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succeed in boosting its share of  the defense 
market over the 1981-87 period. This is 
because California firms are the prime con-
tractors for many of the major strategic-
weapons programs emphasized in the Penta-
gon's spending plans. 
According to the California Department of 
Economic and Business Development, 
increased defense spending could add about 
110,000 new aerospace jobs by 1986, even if 
California firms maintained only their current 
share of  the market. If they captured a larger 
share, as seems likely, the defense buildup 
could add as many as 135,000 new jobs to 
the state's economy. This refers solely to the 
direct impact on prime contractors and sub-
contractors in the aerospace-manufacturing 
sector. The vast bu I  k of  the growth shou Id 
occur in Los Angeles, Santa Clara, Orange, 
San Diego, and Santa Barbara counties 
(ranked by volume of awards). 
Taken alone, an increase of as much as 
135,000 jobs in defense-related programs 
would raise industry employment over the 
1981-86 period from 634,000 to 769,000. 
This represents a 4-percent annual rate of 
growth, or 21  percent for the enti re five-year 
period. 
During the 1982-83 period, however, this 
growth cou Id be offset somewhat by con-
tinued weakness in at least some commercial 
programs. As a result of  the slowdown in 
commercial orders, Lockheed Corporation 
announced in late 1981  that it wou  Id phase-
out production of its wide-bodied L-l011 
Tristar aircraft over a two-year period. 
McDonnell Douglas Corporation-Califor-
nia's other commercial airframe manufac-
turer-will reduce employment in this sector 
during the 1982-83 period even if it con-
tinues its troubled DC-l0 program. 
The commercial sector at best may remain 
stagnant until about 1984. By thattime, the 
L-l 011  phase-out will be completed and 
business capital spending should begin to 
recover, bolstering demand for commercial electronic products. Around 1984, therefore, 
California's aerospace industry may show 
substantial growth in both its defense and 
commercial lines of business. 
labor shortages? 
The question arises whether the rapid military 
buildup will place pressure on the nation's 
labor'markets and manufacturing capacity, as 
defense fi rms scramble to attract workers and 
acquire necessary materials. Some observers 
have suggested that the buildup could aggra-
vate inflation by creating labor and material 
bottlenecks. Admittedly, the Administration 
proposals call for defense expenditures to rise 
steadily as a proportion of GNP over the 
1982-87 period-from about S.9 percent in 
fiscal 1982 to about 7.4 percent in fiscal 




rise over a five-year period is substantially 
smaller than the 2.0-percentage point 
increase that occurred in the three-year 
Vietnam buildup. 
For California, weakness in commercial aero-
space programs, as well as substantial excess 
capacity in other industries should prevent 
pressures of  this type from arising, at least 
until the mid-1980s. Shortages of  certain 
types of skilled labor and specialized com-
ponents could develop, but in general, 
increased military spending should not place 
severe pressures on California's labor and 
materials markets. This seems doubly true in 
view of  the fact that California is now expe-
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Source: Department of Defense, Annual Report 
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1986 BANKING DATA-TWELFTH FEDERAL RESERVE DISTRICT 
(Dollar amounts in millions) 
Selected Assets and liabilities 
Large Commercial Banks 
Loans (gross, adjusted) and investments* 
Loans (gross, adjusted) - total # 
Commercial and industrial 
Real estate 
Loans to individuals 
Securities loans 
U.s. Treasury securities* 
Othersecurities* 
Demand deposits - total# 
Demand deposits - adjusted 
Savings deposits - total 
Time deposits -total# 
Individuals, part. & corp. 





































Weekly Averages  Weekended  Weekended 
of Daily Figures 
Member Bank Reserve Position 
Excess Reserves (  +  )/Deficiency (  -) 
Borrowings 
Net free reserves (  +  )/Net borrowed (  - ) 
* Excludes trading account securities. 
#  Includes items not shown separately. 
6/30/82  6/23/82 
82  108 
254  25 
172  83 
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Change from 
year ago 
Dollar  Percent 
8,790  5.8 
9,746  7.5 
4,549  11.4 
3,785  7.1 
568  2.6 
543  31.4 
286  4.6 
1,242  - 8.2 
2,245  - 5.1 
1,795  -:- 6.1 
35  - 0.1 
14,194  17.5 
13,574  18.8 
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